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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the hiring under un-
certainty problem to model the questions faced
by hiring committees in large enterprises and uni-
versities alike. Given a set of n eligible candi-
dates, the decision maker needs to choose the
sequence of candidates to make offers so as to
hire the k best candidates. However, candidates
may choose to reject an offer (for instance, due
to a competing offer) and the decision maker has
a time limit by which all positions must be filled.
Given an estimate of the probabilities of accep-
tance for each candidate, the hiring under uncer-
tainty problem is to design a strategy of making
offers so that the total expected value of all can-
didates hired by the time limit is maximized. We
provide a 2-approximation algorithm for the set-
ting where offers must be made in sequence, an
8-approximation when offers may be made in par-
allel, and a 10-approximation for the more general
stochastic knapsack setting with finite probes.
1. Introduction
Hiring is a core activity of any enterprise where the timely
fulfillment of staffing needs is critical to its functioning.
In addition to estimating the quality and suitability of a
candidate, the enterprise also needs to deal with uncertainty
that arises as the result of good candidates rejecting the job
offer. Balancing this trade-off between hiring good quality
candidates while at the same time ensuring that all staffing
needs are met by a deadline is one of the most challenging
aspects of hiring in practice.
A number of algorithmic questions that are inspired by hir-
ing settings have been well-studied in literature (see Section
1.2) including the popular secretary problem and its many
variants. This line of work focuses on the online nature of
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the problem and the key question tackled is how to find a
good set of candidates when the pool of future candidates
is unknown. However, this line of research does not model
the other source of uncertainty, i.e., the candidate itself may
choose to reject the job offer (for instance, due to a better
competing offer), which in turn raises the question of hiring
enough candidates by the deadline.
During the hiring process, the “quality” (or value) of a can-
didate is often estimated by traditional hiring processes such
as resume screening and formal interviews and even via
algorithmic techniques (see Section 1.2). On the other hand,
machine learning models can estimate the probability that
a given candidate will accept a job offer based on various
features such as the candidate’s educational background,
salary expectations, location preferences, and so on. Consid-
ering both the value as well as offer acceptance probability
of each candidate leads to a rich collection of optimization
problems. In this paper, we initiate the study of the hiring
under uncertainty problem that aims to tackle the inherent
trade-off at the heart of the hiring process - how should
we make job offers under uncertainty so that all staffing
needs are met by a deadline, and yet hire the best available
candidates?
Formally, we consider the following model as the basis for
all the variants we present in this paper. There is a set of n
candidates, and we need to hire k of them. We do this by
making offers to candidates, which we’ll also refer to more
abstractly as “probing” a candidate. Each candidate i has
a known value vi and probability pi of accepting an offer,
independent of all other candidates. We have a deadline of t
time steps, after which we can’t make any further offers. It
takes one time step to make an offer and receive an answer
from a candidate. Job offers are irrevocable, i.e., once a
candidate accepts an offer, that position is “filled” and we
cannot replace that candidate with a better candidate in the
future. The total value of a chosen set of candidates is simply
the sum of the individual candidate values. Our goal is to
maximize the total expected value of the hired candidates.
We also consider two natural generalizations of this model.
First, we allow making parallel offers to multiple candidates
in a given time step. Second, we consider the knapsack
hiring problem where each candidate i has a size si and
we have a budget B on the total size of hired candidates.
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Hiring Under Uncertainty
The knapsack hiring problem models the scenario when the
enterprise has a fixed budget and different candidates need
to be offered different salaries.
We note that in all settings, we do not require vi to be
known precisely; all of our results hold if vi is only known
in expectation. However, our results are sensitive to errors in
pi and si. Making them robust to such errors is an interesting
subject for future work.
1.1. Our Contributions
We summarize our contributions in this study.
• In Section 2, we offer a 2-approximation algorithm for
hiring k candidates with a constraint of making at most
t sequential offers.
• In Section 3, we consider the parallel offers model
where we are allowed to make as many parallel of-
fers each time step as the number of unfilled positions
remaining and design a 8-approximation algorithm.
• In Section 4, we present a 10-approximation for the
knapsack hiring problem where each candidate has a
different size and the decision-maker is constrained by
a total budget (as opposed to hiring k candidates).
• We offer a connection to other stochastic optimization
problems such as stochastic matching and present a
lower-bound for the stochastic matching problem.
• Finally, we show the efficacy of our algorithms using
simulations on data drawn from different distributions.
1.2. Related Work
Theoretical questions inspired by hiring scenarios have long
been studied in the online setting under the names of opti-
mal stopping or “secretary” problems (Dynkin, 1963; Chow
et al., 1964). A few extensions of this setting incorporate
elements of our model. Kleinberg considers the case of hir-
ing multiple candidates instead of the traditional single-hire
case (Kleinberg, 2005). An older line of work considers a
version of the secretary problem in which candidates may
stochastically reject offers, although this is typically mod-
eled as a fixed rejection probability (Smith, 1975; Tamaki,
1991; 2000; Ano & Ando, 2000).
In addition, more recent work on stochastic optimization
considers a variety of related problems in the offline set-
ting. This includes stochastic versions of submodular opti-
mization (Asadpour et al., 2008; Gupta et al., 2017), knap-
sack (Dean et al., 2004; 2005; Bhalgat et al., 2011), ban-
dits (Gupta et al., 2011; Ma, 2014), and matching (Bansal
et al., 2010; Adamczyk et al., 2015; Baveja et al., 2018).
Some special cases of our model (specifically, when one
candidate is being hired) can be considered a special case of
matching, and in fact, the results we derive here will provide
lower bounds for stochastic matching. However, our model
cannot in general be captured by any of these prior works.
Algorithmic and data-driven approaches to hiring have be-
come increasingly common with the rise of machine learn-
ing (Miller, 2015; Carmichael, 2015). In particular, there
is a long line of work focused on predicting teacher quality
from data (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Dobbie, 2011; Chalfin
et al., 2016; Jacob et al., 2018). More broadly, Mullainathan
& Spiess (2017) describe the integration of machine learning
with traditional econometric techniques to better estimate
quantities like employee performance. Furthermore, study-
ing the gig economy, Kokkodis et al. (2015) use machine
learning to estimate the likelihood that freelancers get hired.
2. Hiring Problem: How to fill k positions
sequentially?
In this section, we consider the basic hiring problem where
we want to hire k employees out of n potential candidates
with a constraint of making at most t sequential offers.
2.1. Special case: Hiring a single employee (k = 1)
To develop some intuition about the problem as well as to
illustrate some of the challenges posed, we begin with the
case where k = 1, i.e. , we only want to hire one candidate.
One might hope that a simple greedy algorithm is optimal
in this special case. Unfortunately, as we will show, a num-
ber of seemingly natural greedy algorithms1 do not yield
optimal solutions.
However, we can still take advantage of structural properties
of the solution. In particular, given a set of t candidates,
the optimal order in which to make offers to them is in
decreasing order of vi. To see why, for any two candidates i
and j, consider the four possible outcomes of making offers
to them: both i and j accept, both reject, i accepts and j
rejects, and vice versa. The only outcome in which the order
of offers matters is when they both accept, since the position
will go to the candidate receiving first offer, and the second
offer will never be made. In this case, it is clearly better to
make the first offer to the candidate with higher value.
Since the optimal algorithm must always make offers to can-
didates in decreasing order by value, we can write a dynamic
program to compute the optimal subset of t candidates to
potentially make offers to. Assume the candidates are sorted
in non-increasing order of vi, i.e., v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let
S(i, s) be the optimal expected value that can be achieved
with s time steps remaining by only considering candidates
i through n. Then, we have the recurrence
S(i, s) = max{pivi+(1− pi)S(i+1, s− 1), S(i+1, s)}
where the two terms correspond to either making an offer to
1For instance, sorting the candidates by decreasing pi, vi, or
pi · vi and then making at most t offers until one accepts.
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candidate i or not. Note that S(1, t) then gives the value of
the optimal solution, and the offer strategy can be found by
retracing the choices of the dynamic program.
2.2. General Problem: Hiring k employees (k > 1)
While the k = 1 case admits a clean solution, the general
case where k > 1 is more complex. We first note that a
simple k-approximation exists: using the dynamic program
from Section 2.1, we know how to optimally fill a single
slot. Doing so yields a candidate who is in expectation at
least as good as any of the k candidates hired by the optimal
strategy.
In general, the optimal solution may display several non-
monotonicities that make it difficult to extend the k = 1
solution.
Example 1. Consider the following instance with n = 4,
t = 3, and k = 2.
(p1, v1) = (1, 1) (p2, v2) = (0.5, 1)
(p3, v3) = (0.5, 1) (p4, v4) = (0.1, 2)
We will show that in the optimal strategy, the offers made are
not necessarily monotone in acceptance probability, value,
or expected value. First, note that any deterministic strategy
can be represented as a binary decision tree, where each
node in the tree corresponds to a candidate to whom an offer
is made. The two branches are the resulting strategies if the
offer is accepted or rejected. Taking the convention that the
right branch corresponds to acceptance, the optimal solution
for the above instance is as shown in Figure 1.
2
4
1
3
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Figure 1. An optimal solu-
tion to Example 1
Note that there are several
counter-intuitive effects at play
here. First, despite having the
lowest acceptance probability
and expected value, candidate 4
still receives an offer with prob-
ability 1/2. Second, the candi-
date with the highest expected
value (candidate 1) receives an
offer either last or not at all. Fi-
nally, despite the fact that candidates 1, 2, and 3 all have
the same value, it is strictly optimal to make an offer to
candidate 2 (or 3) before candidate 1, even though candidate
1 accepts with higher probability.
Thus, unlike in the k = 1 scenario, the optimal solution
may not be value-ordered, so the dynamic programming
approach discussed above cannot be optimal here. We con-
jecture that this problem is NP-hard for general k. In the
remainder of this section, we present an approximation algo-
rithm that runs in polynomial time and yields at least half of
the optimal expected value. We first show that there exists a
non-adaptive algorithm yielding a 2-approximation. Then,
we show that a dynamic program similar to that in Section
2.1 gives an adaptive algorithm that is better than any non-
adaptive algorithm, and hence is also a 2-approximation.
2.2.1. ESTABLISHING AN ADAPTIVITY GAP OF 2
Gupta et al. (2017) study adaptivity gaps for stochastic prob-
ing problems where the goal is to maximize a given sub-
modular function (or XOS function) over the set of active,
probed elements. In this setting, each element e is active
independently with probability pe and the set of elements
that are probed must satisfy given prefix-closed constraints.
The HIRING WITH UNCERTAINTY problem does not quite
fit into their framework, since their framework allows one
to choose the “best” set of active, probed elements, while
in our setting we are forced to hire the first k candidates
that are active. Nevertheless, we can leverage some insights
from (Gupta et al., 2017) to show an adaptivity gap of 2 (as
opposed to 3 obtained by them for stochastic probing).
Similar to the one shown in Figure 1, the optimal solu-
tion to any instance can be represented by a binary tree
T . Each node u of T corresponds to a candidate i (de-
noted by cand(u)) and has two outgoing edges leading to
subtrees in case the candidate i is active (happens with prob-
ability pi) or inactive (happens with probability (1 − pi)).
Any root to leaf path in this tree represents the sequence
of offers made by the optimal algorithm in a particular
realization. The tree T naturally defines a probability
distribution piT over root to leaf paths - start at the root
and at each node u, follow the “yes” edge with proba-
bility pi where i = cand(u) and the “no” edge other-
wise. Since the optimal strategy can make offers to at
most t candidates, any such path must have at most t nodes.
AB
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
Figure 2. A path with 3
segments: ABC, DE,
and FGHI .
Further, since any strategy can
only hire at most k candidates,
any root to leaf path in T must
have at most k − 1 “yes” edges.
Thus any root to leaf path P
can be decomposed into at most
k “segments” where a segment
is a maximal sub-path composed
of only “no” edges as shown in
Figure 2. Let segments(P ) =
{S1, S2, . . . , S`} denote the set of
segments in P . For each segment
S ∈ segments(P ), let last(S) de-
note the last node on segment S.
Given the optimal tree T , Procedure 1 samples a single
path P according to the distribution piT and then probes the
candidates on each segment of P in descending order by
value to hire at most one candidate from each segment. In
the rest of this section, we show that Procedure 1 yields at
least half of the total expected value of T in expectation.
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Procedure 1 ApproxGivenTree(T )
1: P ← a random path sampled from piT
2: S1, . . . , S` ← P divided into at most k segments
{Each Sj is a list of candidates}
3: for j ← 1, . . . , ` do
4: S′j ← Sj sorted in decreasing order of value
5: for each candidate i in S′j do
6: Make an offer to candidate i
7: if i accepts then
8: break
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
Let val(T ) = EP∼piT
[∑`
j=1 vlast(Sj)
]
be the total ex-
pected value of the tree T (note that ` is a random vari-
able). Similarly, let alg1(T ) be the expected value obtained
by Procedure 1 on tree T . For any segment Sj , we define
segval(Sj) to be the expected value of the active candidate
from Sj with largest value. Formally, if Sj consists of can-
didates {1, 2, . . . , |Sj |} sorted in non-increasing order of
their values, then
segval(Sj) ,
|Sj |∑
i=1
pivi
∏
j<i
(1− pj).
We observe that alg1(T ) = EP∼piT
[∑`
j=1 segval(Sj)
]
. In
other words, Procedure 1 obtains the value of the active ele-
ment with the largest value in each segment. The following
lemma shows that in expectation, this is a 2-approximation
to val(T ).
Lemma 1.
EP∼piT
∑`
j=1
segval(Sj)
 ≥ 1
2
EP∼piT
∑`
j=1
vlast(Sj)

Proof. We proceed by induction over the segments. Let I
be last(S1), and let J be the random variable denoting the
index of the first active candidate on S1, so J ≤ I . If no
candidate on this segment is active, we’ll say J = 0.
In the base case, ` = 1. Otherwise, using the inductive
hypothesis,
EP∼piT
∑`
j=2
segval(Sj)
 ≥ 1
2
EP∼piT
∑`
j=2
vlast(Sj)
 .
In either case, it suffices to show that E [vJ ] ≥ 12E [vI ].
This follows from Lemma 3.3 of Gupta et al. (2017) and the
complete proof is deferred to Appendix A.3.
Removing adaptivity. Note that Procedure 1 is adaptive,
since it probes within a segment until it finds an active el-
ement. However, we can use it to argue about a simpler
non-adaptive algorithm: pick a random path down the op-
timal tree T , sort all the items in it in decreasing order of
value, and make offers in that order. This has value at least
as large as alg1(T ) because for any realization of which el-
ements are active and inactive, making offers in decreasing
order of value is always beneficial. Thus, the adaptivity gap
for this problem is at most 2.
2.2.2. A CONSTRUCTIVE 2-APPROXIMATION
In the above section, we have shown that there exists a non-
adaptive algorithm whose total expected value is at least half
of the expected value of the optimal algorithm. However,
this algorithm relied on the knowledge of the optimal deci-
sion tree T and is thus non-constructive. We now design a
polynomial time algorithm (seqalg) whose expected value
is at least the expected value of any non-adaptive algorithm,
and hence is also at least half the expected value of the
optimal algorithm.
We observe that by definition, any non-adaptive algorithm
must choose a fixed sequence of t potential candidates and
make offers to them in order until k of them accept. Further,
as discussed in Section 2.1, the optimal such algorithm
must probe the candidates in non-increasing order by value.
However, using a dynamic programming strategy similar
to that in Section 2.1, we can find the optimal algorithm
(not necessarily non-adaptive) that probes candidates in
non-increasing order by value. This must be better than
the optimal non-adaptive algorithm and hence is also a 2-
approximation.
Dynamic Program (seqalg). We again assume that the
candidates are sorted in non-increasing order of their values
vi. Let S(i, `, s) be the optimal expected value that can be
achieved by hiring at most ` candidates in s time steps by
only considering candidates i through n in sorted order. We
obtain the following recurrence:
S(i, `, s) =max{pi(vi + S(i+ 1, `− 1, s− 1)) (1)
+ (1− pi)S(i+ 1, `, s− 1), S(i+ 1, `, s)}.
where the two terms correspond to either making an offer to
candidate i or not. Let seqalg denote the dynamic program
constructed using the above recurrence. We abuse notation
slightly and let seqalgk,t = S(1, k, t) be the expected value
obtained by this algorithm.
Let seqoptk,t be the value of the optimal adaptive strategy.
Lemma 1 shows that the optimal non-adaptive strategy is a
2-approximation to seqoptk,t. Because seqalg is at least as
good as any non-adaptive strategy, we have that for a set of
candidates C, seqalgk,t(C) ≥ 12 seqoptk,t(C).
Hiring Under Uncertainty
A lower bound. It is an open question as to whether the
above analysis is tight, i.e., whether this algorithm may
actually be closer to optimal than a factor of two. However,
by modifying the probabilities and values in Example 1,
we show in Appendix A that no algorithm that provides a
value-sorted solution (including seqalg) can get more than
0.927 of the optimal algorithm in general.
3. Filling k Positions in Parallel
In the previous section, we considered the problem of hiring
with sequential offers. However, if we have k positions to
fill, we could in principle make k offers per timestep. This is
clearly more powerful than the sequential offer model, since
any sequence of sequential offers is valid in the parallel
model. We’ll treat the constraint of filling k positions as
hard, meaning that if at a particular timestep there are ` < k
remaining unfilled positions, we can only make ` offers at
that time, though it would be an interesting future direction
to consider a relaxed version in which we hire at most k
candidates with high probability.
Intuitively, the more slots remain available, the more of-
fers can be made, which is beneficial when there are many
high-value low-probability candidates. This means an op-
timal strategy must somehow balance the tension between
two conflicting objectives: filling slots and maximizing the
number of offers that can be made to risky candidates. The
following example demonstrates this tension.
Example 2. Consider the example with n = 2t − 1
candidates and k = 2. 2t − 2 of the candidates have
pi = 1/(2t − 2) and vi = 1, and the last candidate has
pn = 1 and vn = 1.
Even though candidate n will surely accept an offer, the
optimal strategy here is to make offers to all of the low-
probability candidates (2 at a time) until one of them accepts,
and then to make an offer to candidate n, who will definitely
accept. As t gets large, this yields value approximately
2e−1
e ≈ 1.63 in expectation, Making an offer to candidate n
first can only get value approximately 2
√
e−1√
e
≈ 1.39, since
we can only make one offer per timestep after we fill the first
slot. Thus, the order in which offers are made significantly
impacts the overall value.
An 8-approximation algorithm (paralg). We now de-
sign paralg, a constructive 8-approximation algorithm, draw-
ing on the results in Section 2. The basic idea is to relax the
parallel offer instance with t timesteps to a sequential offer
instance with k · t timesteps, solve this using seqalgk,kt,
and use this solution to construct a solution to the original
instance.
Given a set of candidates C, let paroptk,t(C) be the expected
value of the optimal solution with parallel offers, filling k
slots in t timesteps. Then, paroptk,t(C) ≤ seqoptk,kt(C),
since any sequence of parallel offers can be done in sequence
over kt timesteps.
We can apply the dynamic programming algorithm seqalg
from Section 2 to C to get a sequential-offer strategy over kt
timesteps yielding expected value at least 12 seqoptk,kt(C).
Let T be the resulting decision tree. We’ll show how to
convert this sequential-offer decision tree over kt timesteps
into a parallel-offer strategy over t timesteps.
Procedure 2 ParallelFromSequential(T )
1: P ← a random path sampled from piT
2: S1, . . . , S` ← the segments of P
3: S′1, . . . , S
′
m ← segments split such that each has length
at most t.
4: Sort each segment S′j in decreasing order of vi.
5: Let U be the indices of the k segments with highest
segval(·)
6: for s← 1, . . . , t do
7: for j ∈ U do
8: Make an offer to candidate i, the sth candidate
from S′j , at this timestep s.
9: if i accepts then
10: Remove j from U
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
Let alg2(T ∗) be the expected value of the parallel-offer
strategy produced by Procedure 2, where T ∗ is the output
of seqalgk,kt(C). Then, we have the following.
Lemma 2.
alg2(T ∗) ≥
1
8
paroptk,t(C)
Proof. By Lemma 1,
seqalgk,kt(C) ≥
1
2
seqoptk,kt(C) ≥
1
2
paroptk,t(C).
To complete the proof, we must show that alg2(T ∗) ≥
1
4 seqalgk,kt(C). Note that Procedure 2 yields an offer strat-
egy in the parallel model, while T ∗ represents a strategy in
the sequential model with kt timesteps.
First, observe that by applying Lemma 1 again, if we could
make offers along each segment of a random path down T ∗
in decreasing order of value, we’d get a 2-approximation to
seqalgk,kt(C), since we’d get the maximum active element
on each segment. Since there are at most k segments, we
could make an offer to the highest valued candidate from
each segment in the first time step and proceed down each
segment in parallel, discarding a segment once a candidate
accepts an offer. However, since some segments may have
length more than t, we may not have enough offers to go
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all the way down each segment. Consequently, in step 3 of
Procedure 2, we partition the segments further so that each
new segment contains at most t candidates. More formally,
if a segment Sj ∈ segments(P ) has length at+ b for some
integers a, b ≥ 0 and b < t, arbitrarily split the candidates
in Sj into a+1 new segments such that a of those segments
have exactly t candidates.
Let |Sj | be the size of the jth segment. When we split it
up into new segments of length at most t, Sj will be turned
into d |Sj |t e segments. Thus, after splitting, the number of
new segments is at most
∑`
j=1
⌈ |Sj |
t
⌉
≤
∑`
j=1
|Sj |
t
+ 1 ≤ k +
∑`
j=1 |Sj |
t
≤ 2k.
Thus, if we were to pick k segments uniformly at random,
each segment would have probability at least 1/2 of being
selected randomly into U , meaning that
m∑
j=1
E
[
segval(S′j) Pr[j ∈ U ]
] ≥ 1
2
m∑
j=1
E
[
segval(S′j)
]
≥ 1
2
∑`
j=1
E [segval(Sj)]
≥ 1
4
E
[
seqalgk,kt(C)
]
,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 1. We can
derandomize this by choosing the k segments with highest
expected value, which must be at least as good as k random
segments. As a result, we have
alg2(T ∗) ≥
1
4
E
[
seqalgk,kt(C)
] ≥ 1
8
paroptk,t(C).
Thus, our final algorithm (which we call paralgk,t, or just
paralg when k and t are clear) is to first apply seqalgk,kt to
C, producing a tree T ∗, and build a parallel-offer strategy
from T ∗ with Procedure 2.
paralgk,t(C) , ParallelFromSequential(seqalgk,kt(C))
(2)
As noted above, our final approximation factor will be
min(k, 8), since we get a k-approximation simply by filling
one position optimally.
4. Knapsack Hiring Problem
We now consider the knapsack hiring problem that directly
generalizes the vanilla hiring problem studied in Section 2.
In this case, in addition to a value vi and probability pi, each
candidate i also has a size si. Instead of a number of slots k,
we have a budget B on the total size of the hired candidates.
As earlier, we have a deadline of t time steps and can make
only one offer per time step.
The knapsack hiring problem is closely related to the well-
studied stochastic knapsack problem (Dean et al., 2004;
2005), which is as follows: we are given n items, each with
a known value and “size distribution”. When an item is
added to the knapsack, its size is drawn from this distribu-
tion. Once an item exceeds the capacity, this item must be
discarded and no further items can be added to the knapsack.
In the multidimensional version, both the capacity of the
knapsack and the size of an item are vectors, and the process
ends once any component of the vector capacity is exceeded.
We observe that the two models differ slightly since in the
knapsack hiring problem, both the value and size of an item
(candidate) is stochastic.
We first give a reduction from the knapsack hiring problem
to the multidimensional stochastic knapsack problem. For
simplicity, we assume that the budget B = 1 without loss
of generality. We construct an instance of 2-dimensional
stochastic knapsack as follows - the knapsack capacity is
[1 t]> where the first dimension represents the budget con-
straint and the second dimension represents the number of
allowed probes. The size of item i is represented by the
vector [si 1]> if the item exists when it is probed (happens
with probability pi) and [0 1]> otherwise. The value v′i of
item i is set to the expected value obtained from candidate
i, i.e., v′i = pivi. With this reduction, the optimal solution
to the knapsack hiring problem remains unchanged if items
deterministically contribute value v′i = pivi, as we show in
Appendix A.4.
Dean et al. (2005) give a general 1 + 6d-approximation
to multidimensional stochastic knapsack, where d is the
number of knapsack constraints. Directly applying this, we
would get a 13-approximation in our 2-dimensional case.
However, by leveraging the structure of the finite-probe
problem, we can tighten this to a 10-approximation.
Without loss of generality, we assume that si ≤ 1 for all i
(otherwise the item would never fit in the knapsack). We also
normalize the number of probes to 1, so each item uses 1/t
probes. Let µ(i) denote the vector of expected size of item
i, meaning µ(i) = [pisi 1/t]>. Let µ(S) =
∑
i∈S µ(i).
We use the notation µ1(S) and µ2(S) to denote the first
and second components of µ(S) respectively. Further, let
size(i) denote the vector of the realized size of item i and
let size(S) =
∑
i∈S size(i).
Our algorithm (Algorithm 3) takes the better of two strate-
gies: probing the item with highest expected value and
probing a sequence of “small” items. Exactly evaluat-
ing m∗L, the expected value of the second of these strate-
gies, may be difficult; however, we can show that mL =
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Procedure 3 KnapsackFiniteProbes(p, v, s)
1: m1 ← maxi v′i = maxi pivi
2: L ← the sequence of all items with ‖µ(i)‖1 ≤ 1/3,
sorted in non-increasing order of
v′i
‖µ(i)‖1
3: mL ←
∑`
i=1 v
′
i(1−
∑
j≤i µ1(j)), where ` is the small-
est integer such that
∑`
i=1 ‖µ(i)‖1 < 1
4: if m1 ≥ mL then
5: Probe the item with highest expected value v′i
6: else
7: Probe the items in L until the knapsack is full
8: end if
∑`
i=1 v
′
i(1 −
∑
j≤i µ1(j)) ≤ m∗L. We obtain v′i for item
i if and only if the first i items in L all fit inside the
knapsack. Thus, m∗L =
∑`
i=1 v
′
iPr[‖size(Li)‖∞ ≤ 1],
where Li denotes the set of first i items in L. By Claim 3,
m∗L ≥ mL. Note that Claim 3 applies since the constraint∑`
i=1 ‖µ(i)‖1 < 1 implies ` < t.
Claim 3. For any set A of at most t items,
Pr[‖size(A)‖∞ ≤ 1] ≥ 1− µ1(A).
See Appendix A.3 for a proof.
Let greedy = max{m1,mL} be a lower bound on the ex-
pected value of Algorithm 3. Let A be the random set of
items that are probed by the optimal adaptive algorithm, and
let opt be the expected value of the optimal algorithm.
Lemma 4 ((Dean et al., 2005), Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3).
opt ≤ (1 + 3E [‖µ(A)‖1])greedy.
For any adaptive algorithm, we can bound the expected size
of the set of items probed using Lemma 2 from Dean et al.
(2004). In particular, we can bound the expected size of
the first component as E [µ1(A)] ≤ 2. On the other hand,
since the optimal adaptive algorithm can never probe more
than t items, E [µ2(A)] ≤ 1. Substituting these bounds into
Lemma 4 gives us the desired 10-approximation:
opt ≤ (1 + 3E [‖µ(A)‖1])greedy
≤ (1 + 3(E [µ1(A) + µ2(A)]))greedy
≤ (1 + 3 · 3)greedy = 10 · greedy.
5. A Lower Bound for Stochastic Matching
The hiring with uncertainty problem with k = 1 can be
viewed as a special case of the stochastic matching problem,
which is as follows: given a graphG = (V,E), probabilities
pe and values ve for all e ∈ E, and patience parameters
tv for all v ∈ V , the goal is to obtain a matching with
maximum expected weight. As in our hiring problem, edges
can be probed sequentially. If an edge e is found to exist, it
must be added to the matching, contributing value ve. Each
probe decreases the patience parameters of the incident
vertices by 1, and when a vertex runs out of patience, it
cannot be matched.
The state-of-the-art approach for this problem is to form a
probing strategy by solving the linear program relaxation:
max
x∈[0,1]|E|
∑
e∈|E|
pevexe s.t. ∀v
∑
e∈δ(v)
xe ≤ tv (3)
∀v
∑
e∈δ(v)
pexe ≤ 1
This LP relaxation has been the primary approach for
stochastic matching since Bansal et al. (2010), yielding a
2.845-approximation for bipartite graphs (Adamczyk et al.,
2015) and a 3.224-approximation for general graphs (Baveja
et al., 2018). However, little is known about the tightness
of upper bound produced by the LP. Not only is there an
integrality gap, but there is also a probing gap – the LP does
not fully account for the random realizations of probes.
With k = 1, the hiring problem is a special case of stochastic
matching, since it can be expressed as matching on a star-
shaped graph. Thus, we can use it provide a lower bound on
the worst-case slack created by the LP. In Appendix A.2, we
provide an example showing that the gap between the LP
value and the expected value of the optimal probing strategy
must be at least 1− 1/e, meaning no probing strategy can
approximate the optimal LP value to a factor better than
e
e−1 ≈ 1.581.
6. Experiments
We test the performance of our algorithms for the HIR-
ING WITH UNCERTAINTY problem in both the sequential
and parallel offers setting via simulations. We generate
simulated data sets as follows. The values for n = 100
candidates are chosen uniformly at random from [0, 1]. We
consider three models to generate the probabilities:
• Negative correlation: Higher-value candidates are
less likely to accept offers. We sample pi’s according to
a Beta distribution, with pi ∼ Beta(10(1− vi), 10vi).
• Positive correlation: Higher-value candidates are
more likely to accept: pi ∼ Beta(10vi, 10(1− vi)).
• No correlation: pi ∼ Uniform[0, 1].
On each of these data sets, we consider the performance of
our three algorithms each with k = 20, namely
• seqalg: The dynamic programming algorithm from
Section 2 to make t sequential offers.
• paralg: The parallel approximation algorithm from
Section 3. We take the best solution over 100 random
samples (of paths).
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(a) Negative Correlation (b) Positive Correlation (c) No Correlation
Figure 3. Comparison of different algorithms on three simulated data sets.
• parheur: We consider the following heuristic strategy
to make offers in the parallel model. Note that the
parallel approximation algorithm effectively partitions
the set of candidates into up to 2k sets, selects the best
k of them, and makes offers to candidates in those
sets in decreasing order of value. Our heuristic, then,
is to randomly partition the set of candidates into k
disjoint sets and use the optimal single-slot solution
from Section 2.1 on each set independently to decide
which of them to make offers to. These offers can be
made in parallel since the sets are disjoint.
For comparison, we include two natural greedy baselines.
We probe candidates in decreasing order of expected value
pi · vi (GE) and value vi (GV). We also plot two upper
bounds on the value obtained by an optimal algorithm: LP,
the value obtained by a natural LP relaxation (similar to
(3)), and inf, the optimal algorithm with t = ∞ (sort the
candidates by decreasing value and make offers until k
candidates accept).
Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) demonstrate the performance
of our algorithms on the three data sets with negative corre-
lation, positive correlation, and no correlation respectively.
Beyond the theoretical guarantees, seqalg performs well
empirically and dominates the greedy baselines, especially
in the more natural setting where values and probabilities
are negatively correlated. seqalg is in general quite close
to the LP upper bound – much closer than the theoretical
guarantee of 2. Thus, the LP is a fairly tight upper bound
on the maximum value achievable by probing.
Even for moderately small values of t, seqalg outperforms
paralg, despite the fact that it makes 1 offer per time step
when paralg makes multiple offers at a time. Moreover,
parheur almost always outperforms paralg. The relatively
poor performance of paralg is to be expected. Recall that
paralg takes the solution tree to seqalg with kt offers and
probes candidates on the segments of a random path down
this tree. By construction, candidates on this path are sorted
by value, so high-value candidates are concentrated in a
Figure 4. Experimental results for knapsack setting
small number of segments. paralg can only select at most
one candidate per segment, so it must ignore some high-
value candidates. In contrast, parheur partitions the candi-
dates randomly, making it more likely that each set in the
partition contains high-value candidates.
6.1. Knapsack setting
We also provide simulated results for a slightly modified
version of the 10-approximation algorithm (approx) in the
knapsack setting, where instead of calculating the lower
bound mL on the greedy strategy as in Algorithm 3, we
estimate the true expected value m∗L by simulating runs of
the greedy branch of the algorithm. We compare the LP
relaxation (LP) to our algorithm. In addition, we compare
to a natural greedy baseline (greedy), which probes items in
decreasing order of pivi/si. We sample si from a truncated
Pareto distribution on [0, 1], and sample vi ∈ [0, 1] from a
Beta distribution positively correlated with
√
si. We use√
si so that expected vi’s exhibit diminishing returns in si.
We choose pi ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and set a budget of B = 1.
As the results in Figure 4 show, our algorithm performs
roughly as well as greedy, but it does better for very small
values of t.
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7. Conclusions
With the increased use of data-driven techniques in hir-
ing, predictions for employment outcomes are becoming
increasingly accurate. Leveraging these predictions can be
non-trivial, leading to the family of stochastic optimization
problems we have considered here. As we have shown, im-
posing a finite number of offers can lead to highly complex
solutions; however, by imposing an intuitive structure on
the solution space, we are able to derive approximation algo-
rithms that perform well, both theoretically and in practice.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Gap between optimal adaptive and value-ordered
strategies
The following example shows a gap between the optimal
adaptive strategy and the any value-ordered strategy in the
sequential setting.
(p1, v1) = (1, 1) (p2, v2) = (q, 1)
(p3, v3) = (q, 1) (p4, v4) = (q(1− q)/(v − q), v)
Here, we set q = 0.63667, and take the limit as v goes to
∞.
The optimal value-ordered strategy is make offers to 1, 2,
and possibly 3 if 2 rejects. This yields value 1 + 2q − q2.
The optimal strategy is shown in Figure 1 and yields value
1 + 2q − q2 + (1− q)q2(v − 1)/(v − q). As v → ∞, the
approximation ratio approaches
1 + 2q − q3
1 + 2q − q2 ≈ 1.0788
Moreover, this example demonstrates that simple greedy
algorithms are suboptimal – in particular, making offers
greedily by decreasing pi, vi, and pivi all yield suboptimal
value.
A.2. Lower bound for LP-based stochastic matching
Figure 5. Lower bound for integrality gap
Consider the star graph as shown in Figure 5 with n + 1
vertices, with n leaves and 1 vertex in the middle. Each
edge has pe = 1n and value 1. Let the number of probes be
t = n. The value of the LP (3) is 1, assigning xe = 1 to
all edges. Since all edges are identical, any strategy is an
optimal probing strategy, yielding expected value
n∑
i=1
(
1
n
)(
1− 1
n
)i−1
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1− 1
n
)i−1
=
1
n
· 1−
(
1− 1n
)n
1
n
= 1−
(
1− 1
n
)n
In the limit, this is 1− 1/e, so no probing strategy can be
better than an ee−1 ≈ 1.581-approximation.
A.3. Deferred Proofs
Proof of Claim 3. For any set A of at most t items,
size2(A) =
∑
i∈A size2(i) = |A|/t ≤ 1. Further,
by Markov’s inequality, we have Pr[size1(A) ≥ 1] ≤
E [min{size1(A), 1}] ≤ E
[∑
i∈Amin{si, 1}
]
= µ1(A).
Consequently, we have Pr(‖size(A)‖∞ < 1) ≥ 1 −
µ1(A).
Claim 5. E [vJ ] ≥ 1
2
E [vI ]
Proof. Let W be the random set of elements on this seg-
ment, up to and including I , and let Wx ⊆W be the subset
of those elements with value at least x. For ease of notation,
we define qi = 1− pi. Then, we can write
E [vI ] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[vI ≥ x] dx =
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈Wx
pi
∏
j<i
qj dx.
(4)
Let A be the random set of “active” candidates who will
accept an offer if they receive one. Then, we have
E [vJ ] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr[vJ ≥ x] dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr[A ∩Wx 6= ∅] dx
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈Wx
pi · Pr[I ≥ i] · Pr
 ⋂
j<i,j∈Wx
j /∈ A
 dx
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈Wx
pi
∏
j<i
qj
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
qj
 dx
=
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈Wx
pi
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
q2j
 ∏
j<i,j /∈Wx
qj
 dx
(5)
We can write (4) as
E
∑
i∈Wx
pi
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
qj
 ∏
j<i,j /∈Wx
1qj
 , (6)
where the expectation is taken over the indicators 1qj for
j < i, j /∈Wx. Similarly, we write (5) as
E
∑
i∈Wx
pi
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
q2j
 ∏
j<i,j /∈Wx
1qj
 , (7)
Conditioning on the realizations of these indicators, it is
sufficient to show that∑
i∈Wx
pi
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
q2j
 ≥ 1
2
∑
i∈Wx
pi
 ∏
j<i,j∈Wx
qj
 ,
(8)
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which is true by Claim 6.
Claim 6 ((Gupta et al., 2017), Claim 3.4). For any ordered
set A of probabilities {a1, a2, . . . , a|A|}, let bj denote 1−aj
for j ∈ [1, |A|]. Then,
∑
i
ai
∏
j<i
bj
2 ≥ 1
2
∑
i
ai
∏
j<i
bi
A.4. Equivalence to Stochastic Knapsack
We must show that the the optimal solution remains un-
changed whether values are received stochastically or deter-
ministically.
It is easy to verify that the vector item sizes and knapsack
capacities capture the budget and deadline requirements of
the knapsack hiring problem. However, in the reduction,
item i deterministically yields a value of pivi instead of
value vi when i is active (happens with probability pi) and
value 0 otherwise.
To account for this, observe that the optimal item to probe
next depends only on the subset of remaining items, the
number of probes left, and the capacity of the knapsack – the
value accumulated thus far has no bearing on the next action.
Let opt(S, t, b) be the optimal value achievable with items
(candidates) S, number of probes t, and budget b remaining.
The optimal strategy is then given by an exponential sized
dynamic program, with the following recurrence
opt(S, t, b) = max
i∈S
{
pi(vi + opt(S\{i}, t− 1, b− si))
+(1− pi)opt(S\{i}, t− 1, b)
}
. (9)
Assuming inductively that opt(S′, t, b) is unchanged
whether i contributes value vi with probability pi or de-
terministic value pivi for all smaller sets S′, we see that (9)
is optimized by the same i in both cases. Thus, the optimal
strategy is unchanged in the deterministic and random cases
and our reduction is complete.
